An Empiresurrounded by enemies cannot defend itself by military might alone. Itis for this reason that the Byzantines have been unjustly labeled as diplomaticcharlatans and schemers intent on the destruction of her enemies. In hisbook The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Edward Luttwakseeks to restore the luster of Byzantium’s tarnished image by discardingmyths and shedding light on Byzantium’s true legacy, a legacy evenmore spectacular than the legends that have ingrainedthemselves into our modern imagination. Unable to defend herself in thetraditional Roman way, the Byzantines adopted a new grand strategy thatwould successfully neutralize enemies and attract allies for centuries.
Necessitydemanded wars of attrition to be avoided in favor of influencing and/orpressuring potential enemies and allies alike through a variety of diplomaticdevices, including Imperial ambassadorial missions, gifts of friendship,dynastic marriages, alliances against common enemies, and conversion toChristianity. Divided into three sections, Luttwak’s bookcovers the Invention of Byzantine Strategy, their Diplomacy-Myth and Methods,and the Byzantine Art of War. Luttwak challengesconventional understandings, deconstructs myths and dubious sources, revealinga rich and militarily sophisticated state that continued to prosper inspite of being pressed and squeezed by multiple enemies at any given time.
When Attilaand his Huns terrorized the peoples of Europe in the fifth century, theypossessed the most advanced war-making capabilities ever seen. The Romanmentality of annihilation was untenable and theByzantine state did not possess the manpower or the financial resourcesto maintain a large standing army that could protect her frontiers. Anew strategy would have to be adopted in order to confront the changingdynamics and a fluctuating balance-of-power in the region. Soldiers wouldbe trained in the use of the composite reflex bow and heavy infantry wouldbe phased out in favor of mounted archers and heavy cavalry.
The Byzantinesunderstood that in order to protect their Empire, they would have to adaptto a new method of war and adopt comparable or new technologies. By revolutionizingthe way war was conducted and adopting foreign weaponry and tactics, theByzantines stressed the importance of constant drill and training to mastermounted archery, cavalry organization and maneuvers. Unlike modern armiesthat rely upon a basic training program of eight weeks, Byzantine soldierswere expensive investments that could not be easily replaced. A soldierwas not considered proficient or battle-ready for a minimum of a year—thistraining regimen, however, made Byzantine soldiers a formidable force.A critical factor was to avoid large engagements that could severely cripplethe Byzantine army. One poor decision could threaten the safety of armyand, possibly, the stability of the Empire. Keeping this in mind, a grandstrategy that emphasized maneuver, ambush, raiding, outflanking, encirclement,containment, and unpredictability became part and parcel of the Byzantineway of war. By avoiding wars of attrition and engaging the enemy on theirown terms, the Byzantines were able to dictate the course and pace ofa battle or war. All the while, commanders and emperors, shrewd practitionersof war, made calculated risks with great success.
Battlefieldsuccess came with heavy costs and high casualties. There were other alternatives,however, which were highly effective and required no cash expendituresor loss of life. These options were highly desirable because, as Luttwak observed,“peace was a temporary interruption of war, that as soon as one enemyis defeated, another would take up his place.” (p. 58) Byzantinecreativity and ingenuity knew no bounds. Envoys were specially selectedand trained to conduct missions of great urgency to remote lands to createbonds of friendship. Zemarchos ’ journey to Central Asia to offer terms offriendship with the Turk qaganate is evidencethat great hopes were placed upon envoys to cement alliances against commonfoes. In this case, it was Sasanian Persia whowas tamed, knowing that any overt aggression would involve the feared horsearchers of Sizabul . War on two fronts was impractical and most medievalstates avoided them.
Belligerentneighbors, such as the Bulgars and Rus , required a different tack. Rather than offering cashpayments or treaties of alliance, they were assuaged with conversion toChristianity. However, conversion proved problematic to Byzantium becausethe Bulgars and the Rus could now laylegitimate claim to the throne of Byzantium. Competing claims as the trueand right rulers of Byzantium was one outcome the Byzantines failed toanticipate. This turn of events surely surprised the Byzantines but theymade strategic moves through arranged marriages with their daughters,showcased the splendor and opulence of Constantinople and its royal trappingsof power, and when all else failed, mounted guerilla-style raids intothe Balkans under Basil II to sate their quest for blood. Peter Brown’s TheRise of Western Christendom and Richard Fletcher’s The BarbarianConversion from Paganism to Christianity are excellent studies thatdetail Byzantium’s push to Christianize the Barbarians in SoutheasternEurope. An especially interesting chapter in Fletcher’s work paystribute to the missionary brothers Cyril and Methodius in converting theSlavs to the Orthodox faith.
The lastsection of the book is devoted to military thinkers and commentators whodirectly influenced the writings of Maurice and Leo VI. Luttwak deeplyadmires and respects the Strategikon ofMaurice for its simple yet sophisticated analysis and presentation. Mauriceemphasized stratagems and relational maneuvers “made of tacticsand operational schemes specifically designed to circumvent the peculiarstrengths of a given enemy and to exploit his peculiar weaknesses.” (p.288) The Strategikon was an all-purposemanual that emphasized training, meticulous preparation and a thoroughunderstanding of your opponent. This was not a manual grounded in theoreticaland abstract terms but was chiefly concerned with concrete facts and insights.A brief section is devoted to Leo VI and Naval warfare. Like Maurice’s Strategikon ,Leo’s Tactica stresses the virtues of training and combatsimulation in order to minimize the chance that something may go awry.
Luttwak gives an excellent narrative case study of Heraclius’magnificent victory over Persia. Luttwak’s reasoningfor choosing this specific example is easy to discern: this particularcase study serves as a perfect exemplar of all the devices that Byzantinesused to fight opponents, especially opponents who possess greater numbersor resources. Flawless Byzantine execution in logistics, strategic surprise,maneuver, boldness, and unpredictability led to a crushing Persian defeat.Heraclius proved that war was not decided by superiority in either manpoweror gold, but in a scientific understanding of your opponent and using thatknowledge to guide your every decision. That is how Byzantium was ableto protect her Empire and to continue prospering for centuries.
One of Luttwak’s strengthsis to show how the grand strategy of the Byzantine Empire differed fromthat of the Roman Empire. Luttwak is eminently qualified to do so because he has spentthe greater part of his career researching and writing the present bookunder review while building upon his doctoral dissertation that analyzedthe grand strategy of the Roman Empire. It is also worth considering thevalue Luttwak brings to such a study because of his keen insightsderived from a career as a military strategist. Like the many Byzantineauthors he discusses, Luttwak sees the worldand especially military matters through the lens of the strategist. Thisis one of the book’s great strengths and benefits the reader inuntold ways. If this book had been written by a Byzantine scholar or amilitary historian, it would have been of much depreciated value in comparisonto the present volume because of its rich insights and its heavy emphasisupon the development of Byzantine strategy through the centuries. Strategycame in many guises and was indispensable to the survival of Byzantium.While other historians may have made the occasional reference to strategy, Luttwak relentlesslyplaces strategy in front of the reader to emphasize its evolving importanceas time progressed, resources diminished, and enemies proliferated.
The Grand Strategy ofthe Byzantine Empire tookthe author nearly 20 years to research and write and he considers itto be his crowning achievement and worth more than the sum of all hisprevious work. Throughout his book, Luttwak contraststhe Roman model of strategy against the Byzantine model and argues thatthe Byzantine model was more sophisticated than its predecessor. It isfor this very reason that the Byzantine Empire was able to endure formany centuries and to experience periods of prosperity in spite of beingsurrounded by jealous neighbors and volatile enemies. What made Byzantiumdifferent from Rome was its ability to adapt and evolve to a changingenvironment without exhausting the treasury, non-renewable resourcessuch as manpower, or the morale of the people. A threat from within wasmore dangerous than an enemy at the gates and the Byzantines understoodthat fact all too well. Keeping the people fed, clothed, and protectedwas expensive but necessary in order to prevent civil unrest. This Byzantinespecialty would see them safely through countless crises.
ForRome, a large professional army could influence not only Rome’sactions but also the way Rome was perceived by neighbors and those whoencountered them on a regular basis. The Roman legion was an intimidatingforce that could persuade a belligerent power to redirect its warlikeintentions in another direction or extinguish them completely. This methodof war served the Romans well but was impractical for the Byzantines fora variety of reasons. Byzantium preferred to recruit allies rather thanannihilate potential threats. Of all the differences between Rome andByzantium, this may very well be the crucial difference that separatedRoman grand strategy from Byzantine grand strategy. Other divergencesbetween Rome and Byzantium included the Byzantine fascination with neighboringcultures and a profound interest in learning about them in a way reminiscentof Herodotus (p. 145). Another key distinction was the fundamental structureof the Byzantine army, which relegated the infantrymen to a supportingrole while placing greater emphasis upon cavalry (p. 267).
CharlesOman held the Byzantine army in the highest regard and was convinced thatthey cultivated martial superiority by integrating theory and practiceand training into an organic military science that could be applied withdevastating effect. Byzantine military science was largely due to theoriginal thinking of men like Maurice, Leo VI and countless others whomethodically cataloged their strategies, tactics, precepts, and the likeinto didactic manuals that could be studied and practiced through simulationuntil mastered (p. 239). A feature ignored by Oman and other writers isthe success of a style of war trademarked by the Byzantines termed “relationalmaneuver” by Luttwak . In the author’sopinion, it “is one of the characterizing differences between Romanand Byzantine warfare,” and when used flawlessly, “changesthe effective military balance by circumventing the enemy’s strengthsand exploiting his weaknesses.” (p. 287)
BecauseByzantine history spanned many centuries and came into contact with dozensof different ethnic groups, many of the sources used in constructing Luttwak’s study are obscure, redacted, or written ina language other than Latin or Greek. For these reasons, Luttwak isto be commended for exhaustively sifting through the historical recordto find a myriad of colorful accounts to help tell his story. Luttwak painstakinglyevaluates the credibility, reliability and potential difficulties everysource poses and renders a critique that helps the reader to make valuejudgments about the evidence. This is a great benefit for the reader whois able to move easily from one piece of evidence to another without gettingconfused by the many pieces of information the author lays out. It isapparent Luttwak assumes an intelligent audience but, perhaps, onenot intimately familiar with the subject matter, which explains why heprovides many helpful historiographical discussions that give the readeran excellent grasp of historical debates and current trends.
For example,when discussing Justinian’s rapid collapse after successful campaignsof expansion and reconquista , Luttwak drawsthe reader’s attention to a long held belief that Procopius’ accountswere not accurate but exaggerated. New evidence, however, corroboratesProcopius’ statistics which shed lighton the seriousness of the calamity that the plague inflicted upon theByzantine Empire. Climatological studies and DNA analysis vindicated Procopius’ veracityand should serve as a warning to historians that they should not be tooquick to pass judgment upon a source because the evidence provided seems,at first blush, to be a fabrication or misinformation (p. 86). Historiansare only able to reconstruct a past with the available evidence and ifa particular source is suspect for whatever reason, it should still betaken under consideration as a worthy source until confirmed otherwise.
This readerwas particularly impressed by the broad variety of sources used to constructthe narrative of this book. Snorri Sturluson’s Saga of Harald Hardrade was used toshow that the wealth of Byzantium flowed in many directions and reachedthe Baltic lands in vast quantities, thus verifying the vast amount ofwealth that Byzantium held in gold (p. 130). Many sources that would notbe recognized by the non-specialist give Luttwak’s storymore richness due to their stories and their locales. These include the Chronicleof 1234, the Nedarim of the BabylonianTalmud, the Chronicle of AD 819, various Arab sources, andthe Armenian author Sebeos (pp. 207, 203, 176,153, and 336, respectively). Luttwak has provideda thoughtful and vigorous exposition of two special sources in their ownchapters: Maurice’s Strategikon andLeo VI’s Tactica . The historiographicaltreatment contained within these two chapters is extraordinary and willcertainly promote and/or provoke debate causing others to reconsider therevolutionary impact these writings had at the time and how much theyhad to do with Byzantine military success.
There isa great deal to be gained from this invaluable book and Luttwak generouslyacknowledges the assistance that other notable scholars gave in the productionof this book. They include John Haldon , Walter Kaegi ,Eric McGeer , and George Dennis to name a few.His modesty and humility are noteworthy because they exhibit what is bestabout the camaraderie that can be shared and experienced by those whoare eager to share what they have learned and those who are willing tolisten. Luttwak’s book would have beenless persuasive without their valuable contributions. His willingnessto seek out, and document in his text, their expertise in areas wherehe was less familiar is an excellent example more historians should emulate.That alone is the mark of a historian who seeks to further the boundariesof knowledge of a subject rather than the aggrandizement of his own nameor reputation.
It is customaryto balance praise with criticism. To put it another way, a good book reviewhighlights both strengths and weaknesses inherent in the argument presented.Because this book was written gradually over many years and thoughtfullyand critically conceived is testament to this overwhelmingly positivereview. For this very reason, this reader is convinced that there is nopoint of contention of any great significance that is worth mentioning.Great care was taken in preparing this book and would be a lofty standardfor others to consider when preparing a manuscript. To give credence tomere trifles would cast a shadow over a work that deserves acclamationand enliven new debates on old subjects. In this respect, this work providesunlimited avenues for future discussion.
Byzantinegrand strategy revolutionized the way the Empire interacted with friendsand foes and balanced those relationships to favorable advantage. A varietyof factors make such innovative and creative strategies necessary in orderto survive in a volatile age. The grand strategy of the Byzantines hadlittle in common with the grand strategy of Rome. The former preferredto avoid war while the latter believed that any enemy should be annihilated.But Byzantium was geographically centered, surrounded by potential threatsin every direction. Military campaigning was impractical and could easilybankrupt the Empire. Rather than fight, Byzantium preferred friendshipand alliance and the strategy proved highly effective. Some of Byzantium’smost loyal allies were the Turkic Pechenegs and other warriors of the steppe. With powerfulallies by their side, potential threats from Sasanian Persia,the Bulgars , and others were neutralized. Thesediplomatic “weapons” were, perhaps, more powerful than anyother human weapon because they neither exhausted the treasury, manpower,or the people who lived within the Empire. Byzantine grand strategy showedthat the way wars were traditionally fought had evolved in directionsthat required creative thinking, a trait the Romans did not possess.
